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PREGNANCY AS A NORMAL CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT:





As the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) turns forty, it
is time to consider how we define pregnancy discrimination.
In recent years, courts have come to define pregnancy discrimina-
tion almost exclusively through comparison. Yet our understanding
of discrimination, inside and outside the pregnancy context, depends
on judgments about social roles as well as comparison. Both Con-
gress and the Court appealed to social roles in defining the wrongs
of pregnancy discrimination. In enacting the PDA, Congress repu-
diated employment practices premised on the view that motherhood
is the end of women’s labor force participation, and affirmed a world
in which women as well as men would combine work and family—a
world in which pregnancy would be a normal condition of employ-
ment. A social-roles analytic helps explain the logic of pregnancy
discrimination, whether it assumes the form of hostility to pregnant
workers or a simple failure to accommodate.
Drawing on this social-roles analytic, the Lecture offers a reading
of Young v. UPS, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the
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PDA. Young breaks from an exclusively comparative approach and
authorizes pregnancy accommodation claims under both disparate
treatment and disparate impact frameworks. The Court’s approach
is informed by a growing popular consensus. As the PDA turns forty,
nearly half the states have enacted pregnant worker fairness acts
supporting reasonable accommodation of pregnancy in the work-
place.
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Just defining pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination
does not tell us what it means to discriminate because of preg-
nancy.
—Young v. UPS, Inc. (Scalia, J., dissenting).1
INTRODUCTION
Nearly all countries except the United States offer women some
form of paid maternity leave.2 The United States requires employers
of over fifty employees to provide their employees twelve weeks of
unpaid leave for medical and family-care reasons.3 But this benefit
is of little use to many low-wage workers.4 In the absence of paid
leave, U.S. law asks working women to rely on antidiscrimination
protections to retain their jobs during pregnancy—while Americans
continue to debate what it means to discriminate because of preg-
nancy.
In this Lecture, I rejoin the long-running conversation about what
it means to discriminate because of pregnancy.5 In recent years,
1. 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1363 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. See INT’L LABOUR ORG., UNITED NATIONS, MATERNITY AND PATERNITY AT WORK: LAW
AND PRACTICE ACROSS THE WORLD 16 (2014), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_242615.pdf [https://perma.cc/2989-
ZG4R] (reporting that the United States was one of two countries that did not offer paid
maternity leave).
3. Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2612 (2012). 
4. Only 39 percent of working parents, and 35 percent of working mothers, are both
eligible for FMLA leave and can afford to take unpaid leave. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN &
FAMILIES, EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF LAWS THAT HELP EXPECTING
AND NEW PARENTS 12 (4th ed. 2016), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/
work-family/expecting-better-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F92B-L2RP]. Only 12 percent of
private sector workers receive paid leave, and most who receive the benefit are college
educated. See INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 2, at 38-39 (reporting that both paid and unpaid
leave disproportionately benefit high-wage workers). A quarter of women are fired or quit
when they bear a child. See LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MATERNITY LEAVE AND
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961-2008, at 9 tbl.5 (2011), https://www.
census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-128.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3SN-HYJB].
5. I first addressed this question as a student, see Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1985) [herein-
after Siegel Note], and have addressed it on occasion since, see, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, You’ve
Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby].
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pregnancy discrimination has been defined almost exclusively
through comparison.6 But as I show, our understanding of discrim-
ination, inside and outside the pregnancy context, depends on judg-
ments about social roles as well as comparison. Conservatives as
well as liberals appeal to social roles in arguing over discrimina-
tion.7 More to the point, Congress and the Supreme Court have
appealed to social roles in defining the wrongs of pregnancy discrim-
ination.
In enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Congress
repudiated employment practices premised on the view that
motherhood is the end of women’s labor force participation, and
affirmed a world in which women as well as men would combine
work and family—a world in which pregnancy would be a normal
condition of employment.8 I show how this social-roles account helps
make sense of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims of
pregnancy accommodation under Young v. UPS,9 the Supreme
Court’s most recent decision interpreting the PDA.10 As the PDA
turns forty, the nation increasingly recognizes the importance of
accommodating pregnancy in the workplace.
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
to declare that discrimination against pregnant women was a form
of sex discrimination prohibited by federal employment discrimina-
tion law.11 In the Act’s first decade, the Supreme Court enforced the
PDA in ways that transformed employment practices.12 However, in
the ensuing decades, lower courts narrowed the PDA by rejecting
disparate-impact claims and insisting on finding exact “compara-
tors” before holding that the discharge of a pregnant woman was
sex-based disparate treatment. Animating this search for perfect
comparators was uncertainty about conceptualizing the exclusion of
pregnant workers as discrimination—and concern about imposing
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
12. See infra Part II.B.
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on employers the actual or imagined costs of retaining and accom-
modating pregnant employees.13
The public did not accept these judicial decisions narrowly inter-
preting the PDA. With defeat of discrimination claims under the
PDA increasingly common, advocates helped enact pregnant worker
fairness acts in twenty-two states, the District of Columbia, and four
cities, mandating the reasonable accommodation of pregnancy.14
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia have adopted
pregnant worker fairness acts, as have the District of Columbia; Central Falls, R.I.; New York
City, N.Y.; Philadelphia, P.A.; and Providence, R.I. See Alaska Family Leave Act, ch. 96, sec.
6, § 23.10.520, 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 4 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.520 (2017)); Act
of Mar. 12, 1990, ch. 15, 1990 Cal. Stat. 87 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926,
12945 (West 2017)); Act of June 1, 2016, ch. 207, 2016 Colo. Sess. Laws 741 (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401, -402.3 (2017)); An Act Concerning Discrimination,
Pub. Act No. 11-55, §§ 1, 3, 2011 Conn. Acts 859, 859-62 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-51, -60(a)(7) (2017)); Act of Sept. 9, 2014, ch. 429, 79 Del. Laws 1
(codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710, 711, 716 (2017)); Protecting Pregnant
Workers Fairness Act of 2014, Act No. 20-458, 61 D.C. Reg. 11,368 (Oct. 23, 2014) (codified
as amended at D.C. CODE § 32-1231 (2017)); Act of Aug. 26, 2011, Pub. Act No. 97-0596, 2011
Ill. Laws 11110 (codified as amended at 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 to -102 (2017));
Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, Act No. 1409, 1997 La. Acts. 2926, 2937-38
(codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:341-:342 (2017)); Act of May 16, 2013, ch. 547,
2013 Md. Laws 5005 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 20-601, -609
(West 2017)); An Act Establishing the Massachusetts Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,
H.1769, 2017 Mass. Acts ch. 54 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.151B, § 4 (2017));
Women’s Economic Security Act, ch. 239, art. 3, §§ 1, 4, 2014 Minn. Laws 767, 779, 781
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 181.940, .9414 (2017)); Act of Apr. 13, 2015, Legis. B.
No. 627, 2015 Neb. Laws 860 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102 to -1107.2
(2017)); Nevada Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act, 2017 Nev. Stat. ch. 319 (codified at NEV.
REV. STAT. § 613.355 (2017)); Act of Jan. 17, 2014, ch. 220, 2014 N.J. Laws 1526 (codified as
amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2017)); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(5)-(6), 296(1)(g),
(3)(a) (McKinney 2017); Act of Apr. 6, 2015, ch. 121, 2015 N.D. Laws 545 (codified as amended
at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2017)); Act of July 2, 2015, ch. 151, R.I. Pub. Laws 963
(codified as amended at 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7.4 (2017)); Act of June 11, 2001, ch. 533,
2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1012 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 180.004 (West 2017));
Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, ch. 13, § 5, 2015 Utah Laws 68, 71
(codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106 (2017)); An Act Relating to
Accommodations for Pregnant Employees, 2017 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 21. (Vt. 2017)
(codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495k (2017)); Healthy Starts Act, ch. 23, sec. 3, 2017
Wash. Sess. Laws. SSB 5835.SL 1, 2-4 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.005 (2017));
Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act, ch. 135, 2014 W. Va. Acts 1121 (codified as amended at W.
VA. CODE § 5-11B-1 to -7 (2017)); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, tit. 8, §§ 102, 107(22) (2017);
PHILA., PA., CODE §§ 9-1102, -1128 (2017); CENTRAL FALLS, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-5
(2014); PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 16-54(g)-(h), 57(b)(1), (c)(1)(f)-(g), 84 (2014);
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And, in 2015, the Supreme Court finally intervened, holding in
Young v. UPS, under long-standing Title VII principles, discrim-
ination claims can impose costs on employers,15 that plaintiffs can
bring disparate-impact as well as disparate-treatment claims of
pregnancy discrimination,16 and that disparate-treatment claims are
properly analyzed in a framework that employs comparison and
balancing, modes of analysis that the disparate-impact framework
employs.17
Before the Court’s judgment in Young, courts reasoned as if the
wrong of pregnancy discrimination could be defined solely through
techniques of comparison. Techniques of comparison do play a key
role in antidiscrimination law. We often talk about discrimination
as if it consisted solely in the differential treatment of persons with
respect to some trait we deem irrelevant to an individual’s ability
to perform or contribute. But in this Lecture, as in my other work,
I question the sufficiency of this account. Deciding when different
treatment, or same treatment, is wrongful requires making a judg-
ment about the larger social world in which the challenged practice
occurs. At bottom, then, the wrong of discrimination concerns the
social roles and relations it perpetuates.18
Yet the social-roles perspective is not just a matter of discrimina-
tion theory; it is a matter of law. As I show, both liberals and con-
servatives appeal to social roles as they argue about the proper
application of antidiscrimination law and concern about social roles
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 11049 (2017); HAW. CODE R. § 12-46-107 (LexisNexis 2017); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 466.1(a)-(b) (2017).
15. See 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015).
16. See id. at 1353-55.
17. See id. at 1354-55; infra Part III.
18. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness”
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 82 (2000)
(“[A]ntidiscrimination law regulates the social practices that sustain the relative social
position of whites and blacks, men and women.”); cf. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The
American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
9, 16 (2003) (“[I]nconsistency in the decision rules used to implement the antidiscrimination
principle allows the principle to be applied in ways that accommodate competing social values,
preserve status-linked practices and understandings, and, at times, shift in response to social
protest discrediting a practice that inflicts status-harm.”). See generally Reva B. Siegel,
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Talk] (analyzing the
interplay of anticlassification and antisubordination values in equal protection case law).
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appears in disparate bodies of antidiscrimination law.19 Most impor-
tantly for present purposes, a social-roles understanding of discrimi-
nation shaped Congress’s decision to enact the PDA.
When Congress enacted the PDA to amend Title VII, it rejected
the long-standing employer practice of firing women who became
pregnant, and affirmed the importance of women as well as men
supporting themselves and their families when they become par-
ents. Congress amended federal employment discrimination law on
the view that pregnancy is, or ought to be, a normal condition of
employment. Substantial authority in Title VII case law, in the
legislative history of the PDA, and in the case law interpreting the
statute supports a social-roles approach to pregnancy discrimina-
tion.20
Because the social-roles account finds substantial authority in
the PDA’s legislative history and in Title VII case law, because the
social-roles account can illuminate workplace dynamics that might
otherwise pass unnoticed, and because the social-roles account is
crucial in considering the distributive dimensions of pregnancy-dis-
crimination claims,21 I draw upon the social-roles account to guide
enforcement of disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims of
pregnancy discrimination as the Court most recently addressed
them in Young.22
In the United States, the limitations of the antidiscrimination
framework have become sufficiently plain that members of both
parties have endorsed proposals for paid leave.23
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See Emily Bazelon, How Republican Politicians Learned to Love ‘Working Mothers,’
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/magazine/how-
republican-politicians-learned-to-love-working-mothers.html [https://perma.cc/SD2Z-4U58]
(“‘We need working mothers to be fairly compensated for their work and to have access to
affordable, quality child care for their kids,’ Trump told a Pennsylvania audience.”); Claire
Cain Miller, What a Bipartisan Paid Leave Plan Might Look Like, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT
(June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/upshot/what-a-bipartisan-paid-leave-
plan-might-look-like.html [https://perma.cc/PE53-7FA2] (“Paid parental leave seems as if it
has at least a chance of becoming reality in the United States for the first time.”); Danielle
Paquette & Damian Paletta, U.S. Could Get First Paid Family Leave Benefit Under Trump
Budget Proposal, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2017/05/18/u-s-could-get-first-paid-family-leave-benefit-under-trump-plan/
[https://perma.cc/SFL2-37MR] (“The president’s first detailed budget request on Tuesday will
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But paid leave will not supplant the need for antidiscrimination
law. Antidiscrimination and welfare mandates are complements,
not substitutes. Generously enforced, antidiscrimination laws shift
costs from employees to employers,24 although how completely the
law does so will vary from case to case. Antidiscrimination man-
dates may well not be sufficient to enable certain women to work in
workplaces built on the sex-role assumptions of separate spheres.
Even so, antidiscrimination mandates still provide important social
goods. For women who are able to keep working, antidiscrimination
laws help secure an income stream at levels that wage-replacement
laws generally do not. And antidiscrimination law has the potential
to transform gender norms and expectations about the “ideal
worker”25 in ways that leave alone does not.26
Part I of this Lecture demonstrates how views about pregnant
women in the workplace have evolved—and persisted—over the last
century. In the years before passage of the PDA, judges employed
practices of comparison to mark pregnant workers as “different” and
to justify their exclusion from the workplace. As I show, these prac-
tices of interpretation continued under the PDA itself. Part II
argues that practices of comparison depend on explicit or implicit
judgments about roles. It demonstrates that appeals to role-based
reasoning are commonplace in antidiscrimination law, illustrating
this point with examples drawn from race-discrimination law, sex-
discrimination law, and the legislative history and case law of the
PDA itself. In prohibiting pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimi-
nation, Congress employed role-based as well as comparative rea-
soning. Congress affirmed that women as well as men could combine
seek funds for the creation of a program to grant mothers and fathers six weeks of paid leave
after the birth or adoption of a child.”); see also Aparna Mathur & Isabel V. Sawhill, Paid
Family Leave: An Issue Whose Time Has Come?, BROOKINGS INST.: SOC. MOBILITY MEMOS
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2017/01/23/paid-family-
leave-an-issue-whose-time-has-come/ [https://perma.cc/3KSZ-WDNW] (“Polls show that the
public is overwhelmingly in favor of paid family and medical leave.”).
24. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
25. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 103 (2010) (“The ideal-worker standard and norm of work devotion push mothers to
the margins of economic life. And a society that marginalizes its mothers impoverishes its
children. That is why the paradigmatic poor family in the United States is a single mother
and her child.”).
26. In addition, the antidiscrimination framework reminds us that legislators, employers,
and judges of goodwill may misestimate the costs of accommodating pregnant workers.
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work and family, so that pregnancy would become a normal condi-
tion of employment. Part III then draws on this role-based account
to analyze pregnancy accommodation claims within disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact frameworks under the Supreme
Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. UPS.
As Part IV observes in conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Young—which invites new consideration of disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims of pregnancy accommodation—reflects
a growing popular consensus. Forty years after the PDA’s enact-
ment, nearly half the states have enacted pregnant worker fairness
acts supporting reasonable accommodation of pregnancy in the
workplace. As antidiscrimination law and evolving social norms
come to inform one another, pregnancy may yet become a normal
condition of employment.
I. COMPARATIVE MODELS OF DISCRIMINATION AND PREGNANCY AS
DIFFERENCE—BEFORE AND AFTER THE PDA
Practices of comparison can authorize as well as limit sex discrim-
ination against women workers, as this Part briefly demonstrates.
History illustrates that, standing alone, the comparative method is
indeterminate and can be mobilized in the service of explicit or
implicit role-based judgments.27 History also illustrates that
judgments about pregnancy as “unique” or “different” that preceded
the PDA and prompted its enactment have resurfaced in case law
enforcing the statute.28
A. Pregnancy Discrimination Under the Constitution: The
Uniqueness Trap
Our law’s view of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy has
evolved dramatically. In the early twentieth century, after the Su-
preme Court restricted protective labor legislation for men in
Lochner v. New York in 1905,29 the Court allowed legislatures to
impose such restrictions on women’s work in Muller v. Oregon.30
27. See infra Part I.A.
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. See 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
30. See 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908).
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Muller pointed to reproductive differences between men and women
to justify laws that discriminated between the sexes: “The two sexes
differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each
... [, and t]his difference justifies a difference in legislation.”31 In the
Court’s view, women’s special role in reproduction justified state
laws limiting the hours and locations in which women could work,
in ways that states could not regulate men’s work.
With the feminist mobilizations of the 1970s, the Court’s views
changed in part. Judges no longer viewed women’s distinctive role
in reproduction as an all-purpose justification for sex-discriminatory
laws and struck down protective labor legislation that allowed
employers to segregate jobs by sex.32 Yet even as the Supreme Court
began to strike down state laws that discriminated by sex under
civil rights law and under the Constitution, the Court created a
carve-out in its equal protection cases for laws that specifically
regulated pregnancy. In 1974, the Court rejected an equal protection
challenge to a state law that provided employees with disability
benefits for common work-disabling conditions incurred on or off the
job, except pregnancy.33 In denying the equal protection claim in
Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court again emphasized that physical dif-
ferences between the sexes might justify different treatment:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does
not follow that every legislative classification concerning preg-
nancy is a sex-based classification .... Normal pregnancy is an
objectively identifiable physical condition with unique character-
istics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are
constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the
coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just
as with respect to any other physical condition.34
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1991).
33. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-97 (1974); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974) (striking down a law mandating pregnancy leave as a
deprivation of due process).
34. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
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Comparing men and women again framed pregnancy as “different”
or “unique,” and so seemed to preclude the possibility of a discrimi-
nation claim.35 (Geduldig continues to shape equal protection law
today.36)
The Court next applied this understanding of pregnancy discrim-
ination to federal employment discrimination law in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert.37 Drawing on Geduldig, the Burger Court
reasoned that under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the ex-
clusion of pregnancy from comprehensive disability benefits was not
sex-based disparate treatment.38 Because Title VII not only pro-
hibits disparate treatment but also prohibits practices that have a
disparate impact on the Act’s protected classes that is not justified
by business necessity, the Court reached this second question and
ruled that exclusion of pregnancy from General Electric’s compre-
hensive disability benefits program did not have a disparate impact
on women.39
As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to
men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based
discriminatory effect in this scheme .... For all that appears,
pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk,
unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this
risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits,
35. Geduldig is often read to bar claims of pregnancy discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955, 982-84 (1984) (observing that “the Court in Geduldig v. Aiello finally addressed
sex equality claims of pregnant women in 1974, holding that discrimination against pregnant
people is not sex-based” (footnote omitted)). I show that this reading is more expansive than
the language of the decision supports—and that the Court’s more recent decision in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), holds that equal protection
shields women from at least some forms of pregnancy discrimination. See Siegel, You’ve Come
a Long Way, Baby, supra note 5, at 1891-93. 
36. The Court’s decision in Geduldig seemingly allows government to single out pregnant
women without raising equal protection questions. Yet Geduldig has not been cited in a
majority opinion in over two decades. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 271 (1993) (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20). Instead, Justices have only cited
Geduldig in dissents and concurrences. See, e.g., Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1363 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-95); Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
Md., 566 U.S. 30, 60 n.6 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496
n.20); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 751 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97).
37. 429 U.S. 125, 133-34 (1976).
38. See id. at 135-36.
39. Id. at 137-40.
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accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facial-
ly evenhanded inclusion of risks.40
Once again comparison framed pregnancy as unique, hence a rea-
sonable ground on which to justify denial of coverage.
B. The PDA: Uniqueness Redux?
Congress swiftly and emphatically rejected the Court’s reasoning
in Gilbert and enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
which amended the definitional provisions of Title VII to state that:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.41
The text of the PDA tells us that under federal employment dis-
crimination law it is indeed possible to discriminate against women
on the basis of pregnancy, and suggests that comparing treatment
of the pregnant employee to other employees similar in their ability
to work can help identify such discrimination.42 A comparison of this
kind elides the “uniqueness” of pregnancy and emphasizes instead
functional ability to perform the job. (As language from the legisla-
tive history quoted in this Lecture suggests, the Congress that
40. Id. at 138-39.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
42. As the Court subsequently explained:
“When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its
disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert
decision.” By adding pregnancy to the definition of sex discrimination prohibited
by Title VII, the first clause of the PDA reflects Congress’ disapproval of the
reasoning in Gilbert. Rather than imposing a limitation on the remedial purpose
of the PDA, we believe that the second clause was intended to overrule the hold-
ing in Gilbert and to illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be
remedied.
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1987) (quoting and citing
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983)).
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enacted the PDA rejected the sex-role assumptions guiding em-
ployer practices and the Court’s decision in Gilbert, and reasoned
about pregnancy as a normal condition of employment.43)
But as we have seen, comparison has no such intrinsic logic. After
several early, expansive Supreme Court decisions,44 judges in the
lower federal courts employed the practice of comparison to limit the
PDA’s reach.
By the 1990s, judges had begun to use comparison to deny
disparate-impact claims and to limit disparate-treatment claims
under the PDA. Plaintiffs objected that inflexible job descriptions
and short leave policies had a disparate impact on pregnant em-
ployees, but most judges reasoned as Chief Judge Richard Posner
did: so long as the employer treated pregnant and nonpregnant
employees equally badly, a pregnant woman who lost her job due to
an inflexible job description or a short leave policy had no claim of
sex discrimination.45
Even when an employer offered accommodations to other em-
ployees but denied them to pregnant workers, courts often rejected
PDA claims of disparate treatment. By the 1990s, the case law took
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding that an
employer’s policy barring all women, except those whose infertility was medically docu-
mented, from jobs with potential lead exposure was facially discriminatory); Cal. Fed., 479
U.S. at 285-87 (holding that the PDA did not prohibit employment practices favoring pregnant
women and did not preempt a state law requiring leave and reinstatement for pregnant
women).
45. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Employers can
treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees
.... But, properly understood, disparate impact as a theory of liability is a means of dealing
with the residues of past discrimination, rather than a warrant for favoritism.”); see also
Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.) (“The
argument here is not that the employer has adopted rules or practices that arbitrarily exclude
pregnant women, but that the employer should be required to excuse pregnant employees
from having to satisfy the legitimate requirements of their job. It is an argument for sub-
sidizing a class of workers, and the concept of disparate impact does not stretch that far.”).
As Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas suggested, “[C]ourts frequently decr[ied] the [dis-
parate-impact] model as a backdoor route to ‘preferential’ or ‘special’ treatment for pregnant
women.” Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 42 &
n.111 (2009). Judges also blocked such claims by reasoning that “employers do not have any
responsibility to rectify the burdens that biology has placed uniquely on women.” Deborah
Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 436 (2011).
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the shape of a debate over the adequacy of “comparators” that
continues to this day.46 Consider the case of Peggy Young, whose
claim against UPS made it all the way to the Supreme Court. Young
was a part-time driver for UPS.47 When she became pregnant, her
doctor advised her not to lift more than twenty pounds.48 UPS,
however, required drivers like Young to be able to lift up to seventy
pounds,49 and told Young that she “could not work while under a
lifting restriction.”50
UPS accommodated some but not all of its workers. The com-
pany offered light-duty work to three classes of workers: workers
who had been injured on the job, had disabilities covered by the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), or had lost Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) certifications.51 Young argued that
UPS discriminated against its pregnant employees because it had
a light-duty-for-injury policy for numerous “other persons,” but not
for pregnant workers.52 UPS responded that, because Young did
not fall within the on-the-job injury, ADA, or DOT categories, the
company “had not discriminated against Young on the basis of
pregnancy, but had treated her just as it treated all ‘other’ relevant
‘persons.’”53 The district court ruled “those with whom Young com-
pared herself—those falling within the on-the-job, DOT, or ADA
categories—were too different to qualify as ‘similarly situated
46. A “comparator” is defined as “someone whose treatment by the employer may be an
adequate basis for inferring discrimination against the plaintiff.” Charles A. Sullivan, The
Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 193
(2009); see also Brief of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 24, Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226)
(“The purpose of a comparator is to ‘eliminate confounding variables’ in order to ‘isolate the
critical independent variable,’ namely the presence of discrimination.” (quoting Humphries
v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007))); Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands
of Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy
and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 574-75 (2017) (describing the role of comparators in proving
disparate treatment); Grossman & Thomas, supra note 45, at 34-35 (defining comparators,
as well as describing some of the inherent problems of this approach in the pregnancy
context).




51. See id. 
52. See id. at 1346-47.
53. See id. at 1344.
984 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:969
comparator[s].’”54 The Fourth Circuit agreed that “these accommoda-
tions were created by a neutral, pregnancy-blind policy.”55 It rea-
soned that:
[A] pregnant worker subject to a temporary lifting restriction is
not similar in her “ability or inability to work” to an employee
disabled within the meaning of the ADA or an employee either
prevented from operating a vehicle as a result of losing her DOT
certification or injured on the job.56
“Rather, Young more closely resembled ‘an employee who injured
his back while picking up his infant child or ... an employee whose
lifting limitation arose from her off-the-job work as a volunteer
firefighter,’ neither of whom would have been eligible for accommo-
dation under UPS’ policies.”57
In this way, accounts of pregnancy as “different” and “unique”
resurfaced within the PDA comparator cases. By looking to the
source of a work disability as well as to its effects, judges deciding
PDA cases emphasized the difference of pregnancy much as the
Court in Muller, Geduldig, and Gilbert had.58 Driving this emphasis
on pregnancy as “different” was a resistance to discrimination
claims that judges assumed unfairly saddled an employer with
costs the worker should bear.59
54. Id. at 1347 (alteration in original) (quoting Young v. UPS, Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011
WL 665321, at *14 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011)).
55. Young v. UPS, 707 F.3d 437, 450 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
56. Id. 
57. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1348 (quoting Young, 707 F.3d at 448).
58. Compare Young, 707 F.3d at 450 (distinguishing a pregnant employee from an
employee who had an off-the-job back injury), with Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139
(1976) (noting that disabilities associated with pregnancy are a “risk, unique to women”),
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (noting that physical differences between the
sexes could justify different treatment), and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908)
(comparing reproductive systems of men and women to justify discrimination).
59. Judges’ willingness to find that the circumstances of the pregnant employee differed
from other comparators often reflects concern about imposing costs on employers, as Latowski
v. Northwoods Nursing Center, 549 F. App’x 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2013), illustrates. There, a
nurse’s aide with a demanding job alleged disparate treatment based on the denial of a light-
duty accommodation offered to employees injured on the job. See id. at 481-83. The court
reasoned that the employer’s “economics-based policy of refusing to accommodate restrictions
arising from injuries incurred outside the workplace” was “legitimate” and “nondiscrimin-
atory.” Id. at 484. (The plaintiff, however, pointed to her manager’s comments to prove the
cost justification was pretextual. Id. at 484-86.) In Seiter v. DHL Worldwide Express, the court
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Perhaps judges channeled considerations of costs into arguments
about the (dis)similarity of comparators because judges appreciated
that the Court has rejected cost-based justifications for disparate
treatment. In City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart, for example, the Supreme Court rejected a cost-based
justification for an employment policy requiring female employees,
who had on average longer life expectancies than male employees,
to make larger contributions to a pension fund60: “That argument
might prevail if Title VII contained a cost-justification defense
comparable to the affirmative defense available in a price discrimi-
nation suit. But neither Congress nor the courts have recognized
such a defense under Title VII.”61 Eight years later in United
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Court applied this
same basic principle to a case arising under the PDA.62
The extra cost of employing members of one sex, however, does
not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a discriminatory
refusal to hire members of that gender. Indeed, in passing the
PDA, Congress considered at length the considerable cost of
providing equal treatment of pregnancy and related conditions,
but made the “decision to forbid special treatment of pregnancy
despite the social costs associated therewith.”63
accepted as valid the following explanation:
DHL has legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguishing between
employees injured on the job and those who were not. Among other things, under
workers’ compensation, individuals who have work-related injuries are entitled
to compensation, whether or not they work. Therefore, allowing those employees
who are eligible for workers’ compensation to perform some light-duty work has
a clear economic benefit.
No. 05-13-DLB, 2006 WL 2457985, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 22, 2006).
For related considerations in a case decided after the Court’s decision in Young, see Legg
v. Ulster County, 820 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[W]hile the cost of adding pregnant workers
to an otherwise expansive program of accommodation cannot justify their exclusion, a policy
is not necessarily doomed by the fact that it was partially motivated by cost. After all, if cost
were not a factor, employers would have little reason not to accommodate everyone, and the
cost of adopting such a policy is presumably always a factor in limiting accommodations to
those injured on the job.”).
60. See 435 U.S. 702, 705, 716-18 (1978). 
61. Id. at 716-17 (footnote omitted).
62. See 499 U.S. 187, 198-99, 208 (1991).
63. Id. at 210 (citation omitted) (quoting Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity
& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983) (Marshall, J.)).
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Despite the express decisions of the Supreme Court, the legisla-
tive history of the PDA,64 and a body of scholarship demonstrating
that disparate treatment cases barring customer preference as a
justification for discrimination regularly shift costs onto employ-
ers,65 judges deciding pregnancy-discrimination cases arising under
the PDA narrowly construed the statute in the apparent belief that
it was unfair to ask employers to bear the costs of accommodating
pregnant workers.66
After decades of silence, the Supreme Court finally intervened. In
2015, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Young by
a vote of six to three, but did so without embracing Young’s
argument that she was entitled to any accommodation that the
employer provided to others in the workplace.67 As one commentator
summarized Young, “[T]he Court rejected the notion that pregnant
women have a right to the accommodations extended to any other
worker, but also the notion that the right is only triggered by an
accommodation extended to all other workers.”68
Before examining the Court’s holding in Young, I consider com-
peting conceptions of pregnancy discrimination, in order to provide
a basis for understanding and evaluating the Court’s decision.
64. See infra Part II.B.
65. See Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 760 (1991)
(explaining that antidiscrimination law can impose costs because “[t]he incorporation of racist
or sexist preferences is efficient, if the efficiency criterion is based on private willingness to
pay; the same applies with profit-maximizing reactions to the desires of third parties and with
statistical discrimination” (footnote omitted)); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational
Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV.
825, 865-68 (2003) (presenting a normative account to challenge the redistributive theory
distinguishing antidiscrimination from accommodation). See generally Christine Jolls, Com-
mentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001) (showing how
antidiscrimination mandates overlap with accommodation mandates and demonstrating that
both impose costs).
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
67. See Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344, 1349 (2015); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 21,
Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226) (“[T]he plain statutory text requires [an employer] to
provide the same light-duty work to pregnant workers who are similarly unable to perform
those duties [as the pregnant worker].”).
68. Joanna L. Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy Discrimination Law as It
Approaches Full Term, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 825, 856 (2016) (emphasis added).
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II. COMPARATIVE AND ROLE-BASED CONCEPTIONS OF
DISCRIMINATION
To this point, we have seen that practices of comparison have
played a key part in justifying differential treatment of pregnant
workers. In what follows, I show that other forms of reasoning of-
ten drive practices of comparison, whether expressly or implicitly.
Judgments about social roles may unconsciously or quite consciously
orient practices of comparison. Comparative and role-based con-
ceptions of discrimination complement and supplement one another
across discrimination law.
Liberals and conservatives alike appeal to understandings about
social roles in debating the proper application of antidiscrimination
law. Reasoning about social roles recurs in Title VII case law.69
Crucially, for present purposes, I demonstrate that reasoning about
social roles is common in the legislative history of the PDA, and in
the Supreme Court cases enforcing it.70
Reviewing the discussion of social roles in the legislative history
of the PDA, and in the Supreme Court cases enforcing it, helps
clarify the statute’s aims. In enacting the PDA, Congress repudiated
employment practices premised on the view that motherhood is the
end of women’s labor force participation, and affirmed a world in
which women as well as men would combine work and family—a
world in which pregnancy would be a normal condition of employ-
ment. I conclude by considering some ways in which the social-roles
account illuminates the dynamics of pregnancy discrimination,
observing how it can coordinate with comparative analysis, identify
implicit bias, and contribute to an analysis of the costs of accommo-
dation.71
A. Two Conceptions of Discrimination
I begin by distinguishing two conceptions of discrimination that
circulate in our law outside and inside the pregnancy cases. One is
69. See infra Part II.A.
70. See infra Part II.B.
71. See infra Part II.C.
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comparative, and the other is role based. The comparative concep-
tion is perhaps the dominant conception of discrimination, certainly
in PDA case law.72 On this view, discrimination occurs when (and
only when) the discriminator distinguishes between similarly situ-
ated individuals who differ with respect to a trait we deem irrele-
vant to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute, such as eye
color, race, or sex. On this view, the goal of antidiscrimination law
is race- or sex-blind social ordering.
I contrast this comparative and trait-focused account of discrimi-
nation with a view of discrimination I term the social-roles account.
On this account, determining whether a practice discriminates re-
quires a judgment about the social relations the practice promotes.
Role-based accounts of discrimination seek to transform social
relations to include and respect those whom we have excluded or
disrespected. Role-based approaches to antidiscrimination law often
employ tools of comparison to identify expressions of disrespect or
the imposition of disfavored roles.73 Comparison may help identify
discriminatory judgments or acts, without defining the essence of
discrimination.
In debates over race, the role-based conception of discrimination
is associated with liberal positions on affirmative action and dis-
parate impact, with substantive rather than formal understandings
of discrimination, and with antisubordination or antistereotyping
understandings of equal protection.74 We see role-based reasoning
at work in harassment law,75 and many branches of disparate-treat-
ment law under Title VII.76
But it is not only liberals who employ social-role based reasoning
about discrimination. Even those who subscribe to equal treatment
models of discrimination make substantive judgments about the
social relations a challenged practice promotes. They must decide
72. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
73. See sources cited supra note 18.
74. See Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note 18, at 1534-44; Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme
Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2013). 
75. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19, 22-23 (1993) (holding that
gender-role-based insults such as, “[y]ou’re a woman, what do you know,” and “[w]e need a
man as the rental manager,” contributed to creating a hostile work environment).
76. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir.
2004) (“[S]tereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of
an impermissible, sex-based motive.”).
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whether distinguishing by sex is relevant in deciding who can
marry77 or use a bathroom.78 Can a society recognize women’s equal-
ity while preserving marriage with “dual gender” parenting, and
bathrooms with a modicum of privacy? Here, advocates of equal
treatment make substantive judgments about which kinds of sex
distinctions are sex discriminatory.
In yet other contexts, conservatives argue that laws providing
equal treatment are discriminatory. Although conservatives have
long opposed race-based claims of disparate impact as licensing
preferential treatment,79 conservatives mobilizing under the ban-
ner of religious freedom object to laws of general application that
burden religious conscience under the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act,80 terming failure to accommodate religious conscience “dis-
crimination.”81 As these examples illustrate, for conservatives as
77. See, e.g., Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 63, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Super. Ct. 2002) (No. 01-1647-A), 2001 WL 35920960 (“In
addition to their primary purpose of fostering procreation per se, the marriage statutes were
intended to ensure that children would not only be born in wedlock but also reared by their
mothers and fathers in one self-sufficient family unit with specialized roles for wives and
husbands.”); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime,
Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 461, 489-92 (2007) (discussing the appearance of arguments for different-gender role
models in state court opinions and amicus briefs).
78. Some conservative commentators have employed social-role-based reasoning to justify
sex-segregated bathrooms:
Would we really be treating men and women equally in anything but an
artificial way if we forced men and women, boys and girls, to undress in front of
each other?
....
...[P]olicymakers did not consider sex-specific intimate facilities as discrimi-
natory in the first place, and laws explicitly reflected that commonsense under-
standing while rightly declaring racially segregated facilities to be unlawful.
The lesson here is that not all distinctions in fact should be deemed unlawful
discrimination.
Ryan T. Anderson, Just Because Liberals Call Something “Discrimination” Doesn’t Mean It
Actually Is, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.heritage.org/gender/commentary/
just-because-liberals-call-something-discrimination-doesnt-mean-it-actually [https://perma.cc/
GCK6-AQ9A]. Social conservatives have long sought to limit the application of antidiscrimi-
nation principles to relations between the sexes. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional
Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1324-25, 1331-32 (2012). 
79. See Siegel, supra note 74, at 55.
80. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(2012), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
81. See, e.g., Linda McClain, Conscience Protection and Discrimination in the Republican
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well as liberals, comparison helps identify discrimination, but does
not define it.
Why focus attention on the role-based judgments that thread
their way through discrimination law—undergirding even the ap-
plication of equal treatment frameworks? The social-roles inquiry
enlarges our frame of reference, tying questions of pregnancy
discrimination to larger questions of sex discrimination of which
they are a part. As the Court explained in upholding the Family and
Medical Leave Act as an exercise of Congress’s power to remedy
violations of equal protection82: “Historically, denial or curtailment
of women’s employment opportunities has been traceable directly to
the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and
workers second. This prevailing ideology about women’s roles has in
turn justified discrimination against women when they are mothers
or mothers-to-be”83—incorporating into equal protection an under-
standing of the relationship between sex discrimination and preg-
nancy growing out of decades of litigation under the PDA.84
Party Platform and Mississippi’s H.B. 1523, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INST.: CORNERSTONE (July
30, 2016), https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/cornerstone/2016/7/30/conscience-
protection-and-discrimination-in-the-republican-party-platform-and-mississippis-hb-1523
[https://perma.cc/2FEY-TAJU] (“[C]alls for protecting religious liberty and conscience
increasingly employ the language of protection against ‘discrimination,’ as is illustrated in the
recently-enjoined Mississippi law, H.B. 1523.”). Mississippi has enacted a law allowing
persons to assert certain faith-based objections to complying with laws of general application,
and the state titled the law “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimi-
nation Act.” MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-62-1 to -19 (2017). For similar reasons, laws requiring
religiously objecting health care professionals to provide patient care can also be described
as “discrimination.” Brief of Amici Curiae Am. College of Pediatricians et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (U.S. Sept.
7, 2017) (observing that “the Federal Government and the States passed large numbers of
‘right of conscience laws’ in the wake of Roe v. Wade to protect medical professionals against
coercion or discrimination”).
82. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737-40 (2003).
83. Id. at 736 (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: J. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the H. Comm.
on Educ. & Labor, 99th Cong. 100 (1986)).
84. The Court continued:
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereo-
types presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers
continued to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men
similar accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually
reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced
women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered
employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their
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B. Authority for the Social-Roles Inquiry Under the PDA
The social-roles inquiry has deep roots in the legislative history
of the PDA. In enacting the PDA, Congress sought to challenge trad-
itional sex-role expectations that limited the careers of working
women.85 As the House Report observed, “[T]he assumption that
women will become pregnant and leave the labor force leads to the
view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the dis-
criminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and dead-
end jobs.”86 Congress emphasized that “the assumption that women
will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of
the sex stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment
of women in the workplace.”87 By clarifying that Title VII’s prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination “includes discrimination ‘on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,’” a House Rep-
resentative explained, Congress sought to “assure that women who
work ... are not penalized for having a family,” and to “put an end to
an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to choose
between family and career.”88
value as employees. Those perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to
subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis.
Id. For an account of how litigation under the PDA shaped understandings of equal protec-
tion, see Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, supra note 5, at 1891-94.
85. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (1977) (floor remarks by Sen. Jacob Javits), reprinted
in S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RES., 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 67 (1980) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]
(“[W]e can no longer in this country legislate with regard to women workers on the basis of
outdated stereotypes and myths. The facts are that women, like men, often need employment
to support families, that women, like men, find their work and their careers important sources
of self-esteem and personal growth, and that women, like men, have the skills and motivation
to make important contributions to this country’s life, if only we will clear away the arbitrary
restraints that sometimes stand in the way.”). For a discussion of the interaction of com-
parative and role-based reasoning, see infra Part II.C.
86. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978) (testimony of Rep. Carl Dewey Perkins, Comm. on
Educ. & Labor), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 85, at 149; see 123 CONG. REC.
29,385 (floor remark of Sen. Harrison Williams) (“Because of their capacity to become
pregnant, women have been viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full benefits of
compensation and advancement granted to other workers.”), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 85, at 61.
87. S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 3 (1977) (report from Sen. Harrison Williams, Comm. on
Human Res.), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 85, at 40; 123 CONG. REC. 29,662
(1977) (statement of Sen. Cranston), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 85, at 129.
88. 124 CONG. REC. 21,442 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Paul Tsongas), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 85, at 185; see also Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra,
992 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:969
Early cases interpreting the PDA emphasized these same role-
based themes. In United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls,
the Court held that the PDA prohibited an employer from restrict-
ing the employment of fertile women but not fertile men: “[W]omen
as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be
forced to choose between having a child and having a job.”89 In
California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Court drew
on role-based reasoning to explain why the PDA did not preempt a
California statute that required employers to accommodate preg-
nant workers to the extent consistent with business necessity.90 The
Court explained that some forms of dissimilar treatment were
permissible under the equality statute: “Congress intended the PDA
to be ‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not
drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise.’”91
Rather than limiting existing Title VII principles and objectives,
the PDA extends them to cover pregnancy. As Senator Williams,
a sponsor of the Act, stated: “The entire thrust ... behind this
legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate
fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the
fundamental right to full participation in family life.”92
The Court reasoned that “Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and
California’s pregnancy disability leave statute share a common
goal,” and, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the first case recogniz-
ing disparate-impact liability under Title VII, the Court observed,
“[t]he purpose of Title VII is ‘to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of ... employees over other employees.’”93
Even as the Court read the PDA to allow states to provide pregnant
employees with accommodations not provided to workers seeking
them for other reasons,94 the Court emphasized that the PDA was
479 U.S. 272, 286 n.19 (1987) (quoting Rep. Tsongas’s remarks).
89. 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
90. 479 U.S. at 288-90.
91. Id. at 285 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir.
1985)).
92. Id. at 288-89 (footnote omitted) (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 29,658 (1977)).
93. Id. at 288 (quoting 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
94. See id. at 284-90.
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premised on different sex-role understandings than traditional sex-
based protective labor legislation:
The statute is narrowly drawn to cover only the period of actual
physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. Accordingly, unlike the protective labor
legislation prevalent earlier in this century, § 12945(b)(2) does
not reflect archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and
the abilities of pregnant workers. A statute based on such ste-
reotypical assumptions would, of course, be inconsistent with
Title VII’s goal of equal employment opportunity.95
C. How the Social-Roles Framework Helps Identify Pregnancy
Discrimination
It is by now well-established that in embracing norms of sex
equality, the nation repudiated centuries of laws and practices that
defined men as breadwinners and women as caregivers.96 The PDA
grows out of this same role-based sex equality, as our brief review
of the legislative history of the PDA and the Supreme Court cases
enforcing the statute shows. In enacting the PDA, Congress repu-
diated employment practices premised on the view that motherhood
is the end of women’s labor force participation, and affirmed a world
in which women as well as men would combine work and family—a
world in which pregnancy would be a normal condition of employ-
ment.
Before turning back to the Court’s decision in Young, it is worth
pausing to consider how this understanding of social roles can orient
antidiscrimination law. On this social-roles account, antidiscrim-
ination law is not solely reliant on techniques of comparison. Anti-
discrimination law can ask: To which social world do employment
practices belong? Does the employer interact with pregnant em-
ployees on the understanding that pregnancy is a normal phase of
95. Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
96. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 651-53 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973) (plurality opinion). See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1984-2004 (2003) (offering a short history of the
feminist movement claims and congressional enactments that changed work-family relations
in the 1970s and ensuing decades).
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an employee’s life, like eating, resting, sleeping, and occasionally
falling ill, or does the employer treat pregnancy as auguring a
decline in the worker’s competence or fidelity to her job, and her
withdrawal from the workforce? Has the employer organized work
on the understanding that women will combine employment and
motherhood, or does an employer treat new motherhood as the end
of a woman’s employment?
Of course, antidiscrimination law may still draw on techniques of
comparison. Techniques of comparison are often quite helpful in
answering questions about roles. For example, in determining
whether the employer treats pregnancy as a normal condition of
employment or the end of women’s employment, it helps to know
whether the employer treats the pregnant employee like, or worse
than, other employees. Yet we can also answer these questions by
drawing on other, noncomparative evidence where there are multi-
ple, or even missing, comparators.97 Even without comparative evi-
dence, “‘stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender
played a part’ in an adverse employment decision.”98 In Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court dis-
cussed in some detail the stereotypes about domestic roles that
shape judgments about the accommodation of mothers and mothers-
to-be in the workplace and foster “employers’ stereotypical views
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.”99
As importantly, the social-roles framework can help identify
stereotypical or status-based reasoning in employment decision-
making, affecting judgments about cost and other aspects of the
business case for retaining pregnant workers. It is commonly as-
sumed that employers make employment decisions on the basis of
economic self-interest. It is commonly assumed that pregnant
97. See infra Part III.
98. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119-22 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)) (reasoning about the claims
of a new mother who was fired after her supervisors had warned her not to become pregnant
and had questioned the ability of a mother to perform effectively in the job; and drawing on
Price Waterhouse and Hibbs to hold that stereotyped remarks can supply evidence of pur-
poseful disparate treatment, even in the absence of comparative evidence).
99. 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
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workers threaten employers with extra cost.100 Yet these assump-
tions may be wrong, distorted by stereotypical bias.
As the race- and sex-discrimination cases so richly illustrate,
stereotypical or status-based reasoning can shape market relations.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, an accounting firm refused to pro-
mote a woman associate to partner, even though she secured more
major contracts for the firm than all other partnership candidates.101
Employers may fire pregnant employees, even when retaining
pregnant employees will save them money. The social-roles account
of pregnancy discrimination can identify reasons why employers
may exclude employees who are perfectly able to do the job, and
reasons why employers may fail to accommodate pregnant employ-
ees even if it may be in the employer’s business interest to do so.
Implicit bias may distort economically self-interested judgments.102
100. For an illustration of these assumptions in action, see Troupe v. May Department
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (“We must imagine a hypothetical
Mr. Troupe, who is as tardy as Ms. Troupe was, also because of health problems, and who is
about to take a protracted sick leave growing out of those problems at an expense to Lord &
Taylor equal to that of Ms. Troupe’s maternity leave. If Lord & Taylor would have fired our
hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies that it fired Ms. Troupe not because she was pregnant
but because she cost the company more than she was worth to it.”).
101. 490 U.S. 228, 223-34 (1989). To achieve partnership, the plaintiff was advised to “walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.” Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp.
1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
102. See, e.g., Jennifer Cunningham & Therese Macan, Effects of Applicant Pregnancy on
Hiring Decisions and Interview Ratings, 57 SEX ROLES 497, 504 (2007) (observing that when
presented with the resumes of equally qualified pregnant and nonpregnant candidates,
evaluators were significantly less likely to hire the pregnant candidate).
Some social scientists propose that motherhood is a “status characteristic,” a phenomenon
that occurs when “widely-held cultural beliefs associate greater status worthiness and
competence with one category of the distinction (e.g., nonmothers) than another (e.g., mothers
... ).” Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 60 J.
SOC. ISSUES 683, 684 (2004). As a disfavored status group in the workplace, mothers are
evaluated more strictly and perceived as less competent and less committed than nonmothers.
Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY
1297, 1301 (2007). Cultural beliefs that both ideal mothers and ideal employees should be
singularly devoted to their respective roles further drive perceptions that mothers are less
committed and less competent workers. See generally MARY BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DE-
VOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY AMONG WOMEN EXECUTIVES 96-99, 102-06 (2003); CYNTHIA
THOMAS CALVERT, GARY PHELAN, & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMI-
NATION (2014); Joan C. Williams, Written Testimony of Joan Williams, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/williams.cfm [https://
perma.cc/DB3Y-2NVX] (“Maternal wall bias against mothers is an order of magnitude larger
than glass ceiling bias against women in general.”). 
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Even when employer judgments are not affected by implicit bias,
they may rest on faulty predictions about employee conduct at a
time when social norms are in flux, and in these or other ways they
may perpetuate judgments about the organization of work that
originated in a social order we have now repudiated. The application
of antidiscrimination law to school athletics richly demonstrates
how equality law can break down barriers and allow new norms and
forms of social coordination to flourish among actors freed from
constraints of sex discrimination.103
For these various reasons, it is crucial to consider the social-roles
account when evaluating the distributive considerations that preg-
nancy discrimination claims present. The social-roles account makes
clear that when employment discrimination law requires employers
to accommodate pregnant employees, the law may save employers
money rather than imposing costs on them. (The efficiency case for
antidiscrimination law dates back to passage of the 1964 Civil
103. Title IX has been “widely credited with shaping new norms” about women’s sports. See
Dionne L. Koller, How the Expressive Power of Title IX Dilutes Its Promise, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 103, 103 (2012). Instead of tying standards of equality to expressions of aptitude
and interest formed under sex discrimination, Title IX required schools to take more
affirmative steps to facilitate women’s “developing” athletic interests and abilities until they
had “been fully and effectively accommodated.” See Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex
Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 47-48 (2001).
Enforcement of Title IX led to dramatic and unpredicted changes in both women’s athletic
abilities and spectator interest. Since Title IX’s enactment, high school sports participation
by women has increased from 7 to 42 percent, and the 2015 Women’s World Cup in soccer was
the most-watched soccer game—either men’s or women’s—in U.S. history. See NAT’L FED’N
OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, 2014-15 HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS PARTICIPATION SURVEY 55
(2015), http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatics/PDF/2014-15_Participation_Survey_Results.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PG9X-PHKY]; Richard Sandomir, Women’s World Cup Final Was Most-
Watched Soccer Game in United States History, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/07/07/sports/soccer/womens-world-cup-final-was-most-watched-soccer-
game-in-united-states-history.html [https://perma.cc/4ERL-5PVM]. Team USA touts Title IX
as the reason American women now not only out-medal American men at the Olympics, but
also consistently beat competitors from other countries. See Karen Price, Impact of Title IX
Still Felt by Team USA Athletes Today, TEAM USA (June 22, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.
teamusa.org/News/2017/June/22/Impacts-Of-Title-IX-Still-Felt-By-Team-USA-Athletes-Today
[https://perma.cc/6P8M-8DHW]; see also Jennifer Rubin, U.S. Women’s Olympic Dominance
Is Not a Fluke, WASH. POST. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-
turn/wp/2016/08/22/u-s-womens-olympic-dominance-is-not-a-fluke/?utm_term=.d48bc94b7a5d
[https://perma.cc/5VHT-LD7K] (“Overall, it’s the success of women who have made the United
States so dominant at the Olympics .... If you counted U.S. women alone, they’d have out-
ranked nearly every other country.”).
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Rights Act.104) That said, employment discrimination law can re-
distribute costs. It is sometimes supposed that accommodation
mandates shift costs, while antidiscrimination mandates condemn
only economically irrational discrimination. In fact, antidiscrimina-
tion law can impose costs on employers, as case law—including the
Court’s recent decision in Young—and commentary make clear.105
Locating pregnancy discrimination in social context makes the
underlying logic of these employment practices legible. Once we be-
gin to identify the kinds of decision-making that has structured the
workplace in which a pregnant employee finds herself, we can ask
a different set of questions about the role antidiscrimination law can
properly play in promoting change. Law that prohibits race and sex
discrimination has shaped norms and shifted costs in a wide variety
of ways,106 even if, in the end, its role has been limited.107 The ques-
tion we now face is how the Court’s decision in Young strikes that
balance.
III. YOUNG V. UPS
To recall, the PDA provides that:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
104. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 11-12 (2d ed. 1971); see
also John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1427 (1986) (arguing
Title VII is an efficient intervention in labor markets); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and
the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 514 (1987) (“By adding a legal penalty to the
market penalty for discrimination, Title VII accelerates the movement toward the day when
discrimination has been squeezed out of markets and the gains from trade have thereby been
maximized.”).
105. See Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015); Dinner, supra note 45, at 420-21;
Samuel Issacharoff & Erin Scharff, Antidiscrimination in Employment: The Simple, the
Complex, and the Paradoxical, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 385, 385-86 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012); Jolls,
supra note 65, at 684-95.
106. See Donohue, supra note 104, at 1423-30.
107. See id.
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persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.108
The controversy in Young concerned the application of the PDA
to an employment policy that accommodated certain classes of
workers—those who were injured on the job, who were covered by
the ADA, or who lost their driver’s license for various reasons—but
that refused to accommodate other classes of workers, including
pregnant workers such as the plaintiff.109 Young argued that the
second clause of the PDA “requires an employer to provide the same
accommodations to workplace disabilities caused by pregnancy that
it provides to workplace disabilities that have other causes but have
a similar effect on the ability to work.”110 UPS disagreed, arguing
that it could accommodate the three other classes of workers with-
out accommodating pregnant employees, so long as the company’s
treatment of the pregnant worker could be assimilated to some
other facially neutral category.111 The policy was “pregnancy neu-
tral”112 because Young was treated as or like an employee who
incurred an off-the-job injury.113 In seeking an accommodation, UPS
argued, “Young in effect claims that she should have been treated
better than non-pregnant employees with off-the-job injuries and
illnesses,” but the PDA “does not entitle a pregnant employee to
preferential treatment; to the contrary, ‘[e]mployers can treat preg-
nant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpreg-
nant employees.’”114
The Court’s decision in Young resolved this conflict in ways that
disrupt distributive and comparative reasoning about the PDA that
had prevailed for years in the lower courts.115 Especially noteworthy
is the blend of comparative and noncomparative reasoning that the
majority employed to make sense of disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact claims under the PDA.
108. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
109. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1343-45.
110. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 67, at 23.
111. See Brief for Respondent at 27-28, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226).
112. Brief of Appellee at 36, Young v. UPS, 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2078). 
113. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 111, at 28.
114. Brief of Appellee, supra note 112, at 40-41 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994)).
115. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Young makes no reference to
social-roles analysis. Yet Justice Stephen Breyer’s opinion for the
Court can be read in a social-roles framework, and doing so focuses
our attention on features of the Supreme Court’s decision absent
from the lower court judgments. Young breaks from a rigid compar-
ative framework, rejects reflexive cost justifications, and reasons
more flexibly about disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims of pregnancy discrimination.116 The Court reasons about the
accommodation of pregnancy in ways that may well be informed by
the adoption of pregnant worker fairness acts in nearly half the
states of the nation.117
A. The Court’s Decision
Writing for the majority in Young, Justice Breyer rejected both
the plaintiff ’s and the defendant’s arguments.118 Young’s approach
would “grant[ ] pregnant workers a ‘most-favored-nation’ status,” he
objected.119
As long as an employer provides one or two workers with an
accommodation—say, those with particularly hazardous jobs, or
those whose workplace presence is particularly needed, or those
who have worked at the company for many years, or those who
are over the age of 55—then it must provide similar accommoda-
tions to all pregnant workers (with comparable physical limit-
ations), irrespective of the nature of their jobs, the employer’s
need to keep them working, their ages, or any other criteria.120
At the same time, the majority observed that UPS’s argument
would have restricted the PDA to cases in which pregnancy was the
only condition an employer refused to accommodate—effectively
requiring a showing of animus and nullifying the statute’s second
clause.121
116. See infra Part III.B.
117. See supra notes 14, 23-26 and accompanying text.
118. See Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1348-49 (2015).
119. Id. at 1349.
120. Id. at 1349-50.
121. See id. at 1352-53. 
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The majority then offered Young a different framework for
challenging the employer’s selective accommodation as disparate
treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.122 (Perhaps
anticipating judicial hostility to claims of accommodation, Young
had failed to plead disparate impact.123) To build this framework,
the majority adapted to the pregnancy discrimination context the
Title VII McDonnell Douglas standard for proving disparate
treatment.124 The plaintiff would show “that she sought accommoda-
tion, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the
employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or
inability to work.’”125 The employer could then “justify its refusal to
accommodate the plaintiff by relying on ‘legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory’ reasons for denying her accommodation.”126 Here, the majority
imposed a crucial limitation on what can count as a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to accommodate a pregnant
employee, observing that:
[C]onsistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normal-
ly cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or
less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those
(“similar in their ability or inability to work”) whom the em-
ployer accommodates. After all, the employer in Gilbert could in
all likelihood have made just such a claim.127
The plaintiff could in turn show that even this reason was pre-
textual by demonstrating “that the employer’s policies impose a
significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s
‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to
justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the
burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimina-
tion.”128 Justice Breyer observed:
122. See id. at 1353-54.
123. When Young sought to amend her complaint to add a distinct disparate impact claim,
the district court denied her motion. The Fourth Circuit upheld the denial. See Young v. UPS,
707 F.3d 437, 442 n.6 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
124. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353-54 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973)).
125. Id. at 1354.
126. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
127. Id. (emphasis added) (referencing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
128. Id.
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[T]he fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate
nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its
reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with
lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that
a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate
pregnant employees give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination.129
The framework the majority announced for evaluating selective-
accommodation claims like Young’s blends comparison and bal-
ancing in hybrid forms that are unconventional in PDA and in
disparate-treatment law.130 The unusual features of the decision
suggest it was some form of compromise, at least partly successful
in attracting liberal and conservative votes. Chief Justice John
Roberts and the three other liberal Justices joined Justice Breyer’s
opinion for the Court; Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the re-
sult.131
The majority opinion provoked an outraged dissent by Justice
Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Anthony
Kennedy.132 Justice Scalia fumed that the majority
craft[ed] ... a new law that is splendidly unconnected with the
text and even the legislative history of the Act....
....
How we got here from the same-treatment clause is anyone’s
guess. There is no way to read “shall be treated the same”—or
indeed anything else in the clause—to mean that courts must
balance the significance of the burden on pregnant workers
against the strength of the employer’s justification for the pol-
icy....
The fun does not stop there. Having ignored the terms of the
same-treatment clause, the Court proceeds to bungle the di-
chotomy between claims of disparate treatment and claims of
disparate impact.133
129. Id. at 1354-55.
130. Cf. supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
131. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1356 (Alito, J., concurring).
132. See id. at 1361 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1361, 1364-65.
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In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy expressed sympathy for
the plaintiff as a working mother, and suggested that she should
have brought a disparate-impact claim of pregnancy discrimina-
tion.134 His separate dissent urging that, properly understood, the
plaintiff had a viable disparate-impact claim was especially note-
worthy, given that, during the same Term, he would write a much-
awaited majority opinion upholding, over conservative objection,
disparate-impact claims of race discrimination under the Fair Hous-
ing Act, in an opinion emphasizing that the disparate-impact frame-
work provides a vehicle for challenging hidden, unconscious, and
structural forms of discrimination.135
B. The Court’s Decision in Context
There is much to be said about what is old, new, and absent in
Young. Unlike the Congress that enacted the PDA and unlike the
Court’s earlier decisions interpreting the PDA in California Federal
Savings & Loan Ass’n and in Johnson Controls, the Court that
decided Young did not connect pregnancy discrimination to other
forms of sex discrimination or reflect on the sex-role understandings
the statute repudiates and affirms.136 The Justices argued about
pregnancy discrimination across many pages and many opinions,
debating the meaning of the PDA’s first and second clause, without
ever taking a step back to ask what pregnancy discrimination is and
why we care about it. Nothing intrinsic to the law required technical
reason of this kind to monopolize an opinion in this way. The Con-
gress that enacted the PDA and the Court that initially interpreted
it located pregnancy discrimination in larger social context. They
talked about the roots and consequences of pregnancy discrimina-
tion; they reasoned about sex roles and not only comparators.137 This
anchor to social roles and social context is missing in Young, and
with critical consequences.
134. See id. at 1366-68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that women in the workforce
“confront a serious disadvantage after becoming pregnant” due to stereotyping, despite laws
aimed at ameliorating pregnancy discrimination, and noting that the majority opinion
“addresses only one” of the possible claims that could be brought under the PDA).
135. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015).
136. Cf. supra Part II.B.
137. See supra Part II.B.
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Though the Court took no note of it, women delivery drivers at
UPS work in traditionally male jobs. Apparently, many UPS drivers
work through their pregnancies.138 But if a pregnant employee needs
an accommodation, she is out of work.139 The employer provides
light-duty accommodations for several classes of workers, but
refuses accommodations for “any employee, male or female, who has
any medical condition not related to work, pregnancy included.”140
A pregnant employee who needs an accommodation at work, how-
ever modest, is out of work, even as the company provided for the
accommodation, not only of those injured on the job, but also for
those who are ADA eligible, or those who lost their driving licenses
for a wide range of reasons including diagnoses of high blood pres-
sure and sleep apnea, as well as DUI convictions.141 What story
about the workplace does UPS’s policy of selective accommodation
tell? This is not a workplace in which pregnancy is a normal condi-
tion of employment. Oddly enough, Justice Kennedy’s dissent argu-
ing that Young should have brought a disparate impact claim comes
closest to acknowledging, and affirming, her quest to combine
motherhood and employment.142
Yet, Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court can be read in a social-
roles framework, and doing so brings important features of the
decision into light. Consider how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Young departed from the Fourth Circuit’s judgment below.
The Fourth Circuit characterized UPS’s policy of accommodating
many classes of workers—but not pregnant workers—as “a neutral,
pregnancy-blind policy.”143 The Supreme Court rejected this frame-
work. The Supreme Court’s decision in Young did not interpret the
PDA as mandating blindness, nor did it define equality exclusively
in comparative terms.144
In Young, comparison is no longer the sole determinant of preg-
nancy discrimination; comparison is now an aid to identifying preg-
nancy discrimination, part of a larger inquiry that invites the trier
138. See Young v. UPS, No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *2-3 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011),
aff’d, 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
139. See id. at *2.
140. Id.
141. See id. at *2-3.
142. See Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1367 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
143. Young v. UPS, 707 F.3d 487, 450 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
144. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349-50.
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of fact to weigh the employer’s justification for selective accommoda-
tion against the burden on pregnant employees denied accommoda-
tions.145 Probing an employer’s reasons in a balancing framework of
this kind may bring to light implicit biases: the employer’s judgment
that pregnant workers are not worth even modest accommodations
may reveal hidden judgments about the competence or commitment
of new mothers in the workplace.146
As importantly, the Young majority explicitly restricted the role
that cost and convenience may play in justifying an employer’s
refusal to accommodate a pregnant worker at the same time the
employer is accommodating others.147 As Justice Breyer pointed
out,148 Congress reversed the Gilbert decisions, despite cost ob-
jections; courts have long denied customer-preference and other
cost-based justifications for race and sex discrimination.149 In so
reasoning, the majority rehabilitated the legislative history of the
statute and reaffirmed PDA and Title VII case law that recognizes
that cost justification is not a defense for disparate treatment.150
Last, but by no means least, both the majority151 and the
dissents152 recognized that plaintiffs may advance both disparate-
impact and disparate-treatment claims of pregnancy discrimination.
Young reminds us that even when there is no “comparator,” the
disparate-impact framework provides an alternative avenue for
challenging rigid job descriptions and claiming reasonable accommo-
dations that might allow a pregnant worker to hang onto her job,
without imposing onerous costs on her employer.
After decades in which courts evinced unremitting hostility to
disparate-impact claims generally and in the pregnancy context in
particular,153 Young may well have reopened the door, just a notch.
As Justice Scalia observed, the majority’s disparate-treatment an-
alysis involved balancing burdens on plaintiffs against the em-
ployer’s justifications, much as a disparate-impact inquiry involves
145. See id. at 1350, 1353.
146. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
147. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
148. Id. at 1355.
149. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
151. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355.
152. Id. at 1361-1365 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1368 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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balancing burdens on plaintiffs against the employer’s justifica-
tions.154 All the opinions in Young discussed disparate impact under
the PDA. Disparate impact was the focal point of the dissent by
Justice Kennedy, the author of Inclusive Communities, the 2015 de-
cision reaffirming the disparate-impact cause of action under the
Fair Housing Act.155 As Justice Kennedy pointed out in Inclusive
Communities, the disparate-impact cause of action overlaps with
disparate treatment as a tool for challenging hidden and uncon-
scious bias, as well as structural discrimination.156
The disparate claim of pregnancy discrimination has been
available since the Act’s passage,157 but the claim’s reaffirmation in
Young may be one of the most consequential features of the deci-
sion.158
CONCLUSION: NEW SUPPORT FOR THE PDA AT FORTY
Looking beyond Title VII, there are signs of change afoot—signs
that American workers are impatient with federal courts’ narrow
154. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2525 (2015) (“Much progress remains to be made in our Nation’s continuing struggle
against racial isolation.... The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner
Commission's grim prophecy that ‘[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal.’ The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing
role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.” (citing Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); and then quoting U.S. KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968))).
156. See id; see also Reva Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality
of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 657-59 (2015) (explaining that
judges and commentators understand disparate impact liability to redress three kinds of
discrimination: covert intentional discrimination, implicit or unconscious bias, and structural
discrimination). 
157. See Siegel Note, supra note 5 (arguing that comparable treatment does not exhaust
the PDA’s requirements, demonstrating that the PDA authorizes both disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact claims, and analyzing disparate impact pregnancy accommodation
claims that employees might bring).
158. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 46, at 561-62 (arguing that Young blurred the distinction
between disparate treatment and impact claims because doing so “is more suitable for
capturing unconscious or implicit bias than one limited to employer actions based on a
deliberate intent to discriminate”). See generally L. Camille Hébert, Disparate Impact and
Pregnancy: Title VII’s Other Accommodation Requirement, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 107 (2015). 
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interpretation of the PDA.159 Nearly half the states—twenty-two
states, the District of Columbia, and four cities—have enacted some
form of a pregnant worker fairness act that mandates the reason-
able accommodation of pregnancy unless the accommodation im-
poses an undue hardship on an employer’s business.160 These states
include red states, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Utah, as well as blue
states, California, Connecticut, and New Jersey. However weak or
strong their enforcement may be, the statutes signal the growing
belief that working women have a right to hang onto their jobs when
they become mothers, and that their income is crucial to a family’s
survival. No doubt, more vigorous enforcement of the PDA will spur
passage and enforcement of these acts, as the acts will spur more
vigorous enforcement of the PDA. That is as it should be, as the
PDA turns forty.
These developments suggest that accommodating working par-
ents could emerge as a bridge issue, with power to move people
across the political spectrum, even in these polarized times. In the
United States, there is growing talk of affordable child care and paid
family leave.161 But we are a long way from realizing that promise.
Job retention matters—until we enact paid leave, and after. Under
the PDA, disparate treatment and disparate impact law mandate
modest accommodations that help pregnant women hang on to their
jobs—and forge a more gender-equal workplace in the process.
159. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Steven Findlay, Paid Parental Leave May Be the Idea that Transcends
Politics, USA TODAY (July 23, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2017/07/22/paid-parental-leave-idea-could-transcend-politics/501967001/ [https://perma.cc/
DJX6-U4CP].
